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Abstract: 
 
The key objective of our study is to re-examine again the stability of selected 
East Asian currencies.  Had there been any other attacks on these currencies prior to 
their meltdowns in 1997? Equally important, have the currencies stabilized during the 
post-1997 crisis?  To address these questions, we adopt the concept of exchange 
market pressure (EMP) index of Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998). Due to 
non-normality of the statistical distribution of the EMP indices in general, this study 
applies the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) as proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, 
and Palm (2001). Lastly, we document events that arguably contribute to speculative 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The remarkable achievement of high and sustained economic growth in the 
East Asian countries prior to the 1997-financial crises has long been the subject of 
many studies.  A number of independent (and even contradictory) analyses have 
been proposed to explain the economic success of these economies (Sarel (1996)). 
Yet, most of these studies agree that the East Asian economies have achieved rapid 
growth through an astonishing mobilisation of resources.  
The drive towards financial liberalisation in the late 1980s, further opening of 
the capital account, and the stability of macroeconomic indicators have been 
frequently underlined as key pull factors for the massive inflows of foreign capitals in 
both of the banking and the stock exchanges of these economies, especially in 
1990s. The World Bank report on the East-Asian miracle points out that “the 
macroeconomic management was unusually good, providing the stable environment 
essential for private investment” (page 5 of the World Bank (1993))
1,2. Among a 
number of sound macroeconomic policy managements, the study has specifically 
underlined the success of the policy makers of these economies in maintaining stable 
exchange rates of the local currencies, particularly against the US dollar.
3  
We wish to revisit and re-examine again this widely accepted notion of stable 
currencies in five key crisis-effected East Asian economies, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and South Korea. Two fundamental questions are 
posted here. Had there been any evidences of other attacks on these currencies 
prior to their meltdowns in 1997? If there had in fact been a large number of attacks, 
then we would argue that these currencies were vulnerable and unstable. 
                                                 
1  See Rajan and Siregar (2002) on the estimation of the size of capital inflows to different 
East Asian economies, particularly in early to mid-1990s. 
2 It should be noted at this point that among the five East East countries covered in this study, 
the Philippines was not included in the World Bank (1993) study. 
3 Most of the East Asian economies in 1990s have actively intervened its foreign exchange 
market to manage the fluctuations of the local currencies, particularly against the US dollar 
(Hernandez and Montiel (2003), McKinnon (2001), (Bubula and Otket-Robe (2002)) and 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002)). 
   4
Equally important, have the currencies stabilized during the post-1997 crisis? 
Given the re-occurrences of currency crises in other parts of the world, particularly, in 
different Latin American countries in the past two decades, a more in-depth 
understanding of the East Asian currencies during the post 1997-crisis period are 
called for and considered vital to prevent future currency crises in this region.    
In addressing these questions, this study will expose two fundamental 
weaknesses of early analyses/evaluations on whether a currency is stable (strong) or 
unstable (vulnerable). Firstly, it is arguably inadequate to generally conclude that a 
currency is stable by solely observing the changes in its nominal exchange rate. As 
this study will show, past experiences of different countries in the world, including 
those of the East Asian economies, have illustrated time and again that incidences of 
currency attacks do occur despite the nominal exchange rate of a currency remaining 
stable. The incidence of speculative attacks, especially when the frequency is quite 
high within a relatively short period of time, arguably suggests that the currency is 
vulnerable and under continuous selling pressures.       
Secondly, one important lesson that can be distilled out of studies emanating 
from leading indicators of currency crises is that the way the studies defined on how 
big (small) a change in nominal exchange rates is needed to qualify as unstable 
(stable) has largely been of an arbitrary process. For instance, in the context of 
defining a currency crash, Frankel and Rose (1996) apply a nominal exchange rate 
depreciations of 25 percent or more and exceeding last year’s depreciation by at 
least 10 per cent. The adoption of arbitrary variations in thresholds of 1-3 standard 
deviations above the mean value of an exchange market pressure index is also quite 
frequent.
4 However, as we will show, the problem with these measures of thresholds 
that exclusively rely on standard deviations as a measure of the extent of volatility is 
usually based on the basic assumption of a normal distribution on the index of 
                                                 
4  See Eichengreen-Rose-Wyplosz ((1994), (1995), (1996)); Berg-Patillo (1998); Kaminsky-
Lizondo-Reinhart (1998); Kaminsky-Reinhart (1999); Edison (2003), and among others.   5
exchange market pressure and its corresponding components. Studies as early as 
the 1960s have clearly established, however, that short-term foreign currency 
fluctuations/returns and interest rates are non-normal, displayed fat and heavy-tails. 
5 
To better measure the incidence of speculative attacks on a currency, we will 
adopt a version of the concept of exchange market pressure (EMP) index as 
employed by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998 and 1999)---henceforth KLR 
index. As will be described further in section 2 of the paper, this index is constructed 
as a weighted average of the rate of depreciation of the local currency (mostly 
against the US dollar in either nominal or real terms), the monthly percentage 
changes in international reserves, and the monthly change in the interest rate.    
It is important to immediately underscore at this point that an exchange 
market pressure (EMP) is not only defined as capturing instances of successful 
attacks, i.e., when a significantly large depreciation of the currency occurs, but as 
well as instances of unsuccessful attacks (pressure rebuffed by loss in reserves 
and/or rise in interest rates) (Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; Goldstein, 
Kaminsky, and Reinhart, 2000). 
Furthermore, due to the non-normality of the statistical distribution of the EMP 
indices in general, we have to avoid relying too much on parametric assumptions in 
identifying the threshold. Accordingly, our study will apply the Extreme Value Theory 
(EVT) and adopt a modified estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and 
Palm (2001) ---henceforth HKKP. 
To our knowledge, hardly any studies have applied the EVT methodology to 
understand the rise and fall of the EMP in the case of the East Asian currencies. A 
recent one is by Pozo and Dorantes (2003). Their study applied the EVT to a version 
of the EMP index employed by Eichengreen-Rose-Wyplosz (1996) to identify periods 
                                                 
5  (Mandelbrot (1963), (1964), (1967), Roll (1970); Rogalski and Vinso (1978); McFarland, 
Petit, and Sung (1982); Boothe and Glassman (1987) and Koedijk, Schafgans and de Vries 
(1990); Brenner, Harjes, and Kronner (1996); Andersen and Lund (1997); Koedijk, Nissen, 
Schotman, and Wolff (1997)).     
   6
of currency crisis in three regions: Asia, Europe and Latin America countries from the   
mid-1960s to 1997. Pozo and Dorantes (2003) opted to pool the countries’ EMPs and 
estimate the regional values of the tail parameter (instead of individual countries) to 
avoid the potential problem of small sample sizes. The pooling of the countries on a 
regional basis, however, is arguably a statistically inappropriate measure. Even 
during the pre-1997 financial crisis period that they cover, we can immediately 
capture the wide divergences of the EMP mean and the standard deviations among 
the Asian and the Latin American countries, with Indonesia and Paraguay having the 
total absolute value of mean and one standard deviation of the EMP about twice as 
much as that of Singapore and Bolivia, respectively.
6 As shown in Table 1, the 
statistical divergence continues to be quite significant when we include the currency-
crisis period of 1998-2003.  
To generate more consistent analyses, we adopt the HKKP tail index 
estimator, which is unbiased in small sample cases. The application of HKKP 
methodology allows us to examine five East Asian economies individually (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and South Korea) with a relatively small sample size.  
Our study covers the period from 1985 to 2003. Given the extended period of 
observations, we aim to capture the most recent episodes of crises in the region and 
to conduct comparative analyses between the pre-1997 and post-1997 crisis periods.  
Based on the empirical findings, we then document events that may have 
arguably contributed to the rise in the EMP index during those two periods. The 
chronological listing of both economic and political events, which may be suggestive 
of events that have contributed to currency ‘stress’ in these economies, allow us to 
understand more the nature of different episodes of high currency pressures in these 
economies. These events allude to the susceptibility of these economies to currency 
crises. In the presence of a lingering vulnerability, the occurrence of any random 
                                                 
6  Refer to Table 2 of Pozo and Dorantes (2003), pp. 598.   7
shock or trigger event can precipitate any crisis. This elaborated listing of the events 
is another main contribution of this paper to the current literature in this field.   
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will briefly review the basic 
constructions of the exchange market pressure index suggested by Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). The Extreme Value Theory and the HKKP 
methodology will be discussed in section 3. The empiric section covering the data 
and the testing will then follow  (section 4). Section 5 presents and discusses 
different events that may have arguably been responsible for the currency attacks. 
This paper ends with brief concluding remarks (section 6).   
  
2.  The Exchange Market Pressure Index 
Considering large movements in nominal exchange rates accounts for the 
most dramatic forms of currency crises, e.g., episodes of forced devaluation which 
emanate from a sharp break from a historical regime of fixity and accelerations of 
depreciations from a regime of more flexible rates, volatility alone in the nominal 
exchange rate understate the magnitude of crises as this excludes episodes of 
unsuccessful attacks. Government policies manifested through monetary policy 
actions and intervention in the foreign exchange market, moderate supposed large 
movements in exchange rates. In the same manner, considering in isolation, 
movements in reserves and interest rate aside from exchange rates also offer only a 
partial view of the severity of shocks in the economy. Nonetheless, combining them 
should convey a more informative and reasonable measure of the extent of currency 
crises, and referred to as the index of exchange market pressure.          
The seminal idea comes from the early work of Girton-Roper (1977) that any 
excess demand for foreign exchange can be fulfilled through non-mutually exclusive 
conduits. If the speculative attack (currency pressure) is successful, there is a sharp 
depreciation of the domestic currency. However, at other times, the attack can be   8
repelled or warded off through raising interest rates and/or running down on the 
foreign exchange reserves.  
In so doing, a measure of the extent of currency pressure can be constructed 
as a weighted average of the changes in exchange rate, in foreign exchange 
reserves, and in interest rates. The exchange rate is said to be under ‘stress’ (there 
is selling pressure) if there is a significant increase in the exchange market pressure 
index.  
The question is how to weigh the three components of the index of 
speculative pressure. An unweighted index is simpler to construct, but the major 
drawback is that an unweighted index will be driven or dominated by the most volatile 
variable, and usually it is the movements in reserves. Next, we will briefly review a 
recently commonly adopted construction of the EMP index that will then be employed 
for our empirics. 
 
2.1  Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998 and 1999) 
The original construction of the EMP index of Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
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However, they also noted the important role of interest rate in capturing the 
market pressures on exchange rate at any particular period of time.
7  Hence for our 
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where, in addition to the basic variables listed in equation (1), we have  t i, int  the 
nominal interest rate for country i in period t; and  int σ  the standard deviation of the 
change in the nominal interest rate,  . int ,t i ∆   
From equation (1b), one can observe the different weights given to these 
three key components of exchange market pressures. In particular, the weights for 
the interest rate and reserve fluctuations depend on the relative size of their standard 
deviations ( int σ  and  r σ , respectively) against that of the exchange rate ( e σ ).  The 
EMP index increases with a depreciation of the domestic currency, a loss of 
international reserve and a rise in the domestic interest rate. A rise in index reflects 
stronger selling pressure on the domestic currency. 
 
3.  The Extreme Value Theory and The HKKP (2001) 
3.1  Extreme Value Theory
8 
 
  Consider a stationary sequence X1, X2,￿., Xn of iid random variables with a 
common distribution function F (d.f.F). Suppose one is interested in the probability 
that the maximum 
Mn = max(X1,X2,￿..,Xn)    (2)  
of the first n random variables is below a certain level x. As is well known, this 
probability is given by  
                                                 
7  KLR (1999) argue that they did not include the interest rate component in their application 
because of the lack of complete interest rate data for the countries that they studied (pg.498). 
8 This section draws heavily from de Vries (1994), Koedijk and Kool (1992), Koedijk, Stork, 
and de Vries (1992); Huisman, Koedijk, Kool and Palm (2001).   10
P(Mn ) x ≤ = F
n(x)       ( 3 )  
Extreme value theory studies the limiting distribution of the order statistic Mn 
appropriately scaled. That is, one is interested under which conditions there exist 
suitable two normalising constants an > 0 and bn, such that: 
) ( ) ( x G x a b M P
d
n n n →  ≤ −                         (4) 
where G(x) is a so-called a extreme value distribution and the superscript d indicates 
convergence in distribution. If 1 – F(x) is regularly varying at infinity, choosing bn = 0 
and an = F
-1(1 – 1/n) we have 
) exp( ) (
α − − = x x G          α  > 0                         (5) 
where α  is the tail index. The tail index is a good indicator of the tail fatness as it is 
related to the number of moments that exist.  
  The advantage of the extreme value approach is that all fat-tailed models are 
nested with respect to their tail index into one model. The tail index, given a number 
of observations Xi can be estimated by parametric and nonparametric methods. The 
latter method is presented. Assume that X1,￿..,Xn is a sample of independent 
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Suppose the density f(x) exists. Through integration by parts we have the following 
equivalence: 
∫
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Combining equation (5) and (6) and applying the Lebesque convergence theorem 


























dx x f t x
t           (8) 
Let  X(n)≥   X(n-1)≥ …  ≥ X(1) denote the ascending order statistics from the sample 
X1,…., Xn. Replace the left-hand side expression of equation (7) by its simple analog 
in order to estimate the inverse tail index γ  = 1/α . Let Fn(.) denote the empirical 
distribution function. Thus, for some k, which is the number of tail observations used 
to estimate α  and n represents the total number of return observations, take t = X(n-k) 
and hence: 













γ                                     (9) 
is the estimator first proposed by Hill (1975). Mason (1982) proved that under some 
regularity conditions γ ˆ is a consistent estimator for γ . Goldie and Smith (1987) 
showed that 
2 / 1 ) ˆ ( k γ γ − is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance γ
2. 
Consequently, α ˆ is also asymptotically normal with mean α  and variance α
2/k.  
 
3.2  The Hill and the HKKP Estimator 
  However, given the relatively small observation size that we have for this 
study, the Hill estimator will suffer from small sample bias. To deal with this, we apply 
the tail index estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Palm (2001) ---
henceforth HKKP---, which is unbiased in small sample cases. The HKKP 
methodology starts with the Hill (1975) estimator presented earlier (Eq.9) with a 
slightly different expression: 
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γ     (10) 
  where, as discussed early, we assume that there is a sample of n positive 
independent observations drawn from some unknown fat-tailed distribution. Let the 
parameter γ  be the tail-index of the distribution, and  ) (i x  be the ith-order statistic   12
such that  ) ( ) 1 ( i x i x ≤ −  for  . ,......, 2 n i =   k  is the pre-specified number of tail 
observations. Note by ordering the observation by its size and not by the original 
dates, the sample observations are arguably becoming independently distributed. 
Naturally, the choice of k  is crucial to obtain an unbiased estimate of the tail-index. 
  HKKP (2001) shows that for a general class of distribution functions the 
asymptotic expected value of the conventional hill estimator to be biased and 
increasing monotonically with k . Similarly, the asymptotic variance of the Hill 









 Generally, this problem will only be resolved 
when the sample size goes to infinity for given k . 
  For our small sample observations, HKKP (2001) introduces an estimator that 
overcomes the problem of the need to select a “single” optimal k  in small sample 
observations. HKKP (2001) proposes that for values of k  smaller than some 
threshold value κ , the bias of the conventional Hill estimate of γ  increases almost 
linearly in k  and can be approximated by: 
) ( ) ( 1 0 k k k ε β β γ + + = ,   κ ,...., 2 , 1 = k     (11) 
where:  0 β and  1 β  are the intercept and the estimate coefficient.  ) (k ε is a disturbance 
term.  HKKP (2001) also shows that the modified Hill estimator is quite robust with 








. Accordingly, for our empirics, we propose to 









  To estimate Equation (11), HKKP (2001) adopt the Weighed Least Squares 
(WLS), instead of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), to deal with the potential 
heteroscedasticity in the error term  )) ( ( k ε of Equation (11). The weight has 
( ) k ,...... 2 , 1  as diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere. The estimate of γ from 
the WLS regression is an approximately unbiased estimate of the tail-index.    13
4.  Data and Empirical Testing 
4.1 Data 
  All data in monthly frequencies were drawn from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics database covering the period from 1985 to 2003. We considered 
a number of East Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand). The exchange rate is expressed in local currency per U.S. dollar. To avoid 
the issue in some countries of treating separately high-inflation episodes with regard 
to the construction of the exchange market pressure (EMP) indices, a measure of the 
real exchange rate is calculated by multiplying the nominal exchange rate by the 
relative price given as:
9 
           
t







. . / . . / =     (12) 
where Pt  is the domestic consumer price index, and P
* is the U.S. consumer price 
index. An increase in RERt (real exchange rate) or NERt (nominal exchange rate) 
implies an appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the relevant local currency. 
The remaining data requirements in the construction of the exchange market 
pressure indices are as follows.  The overnight money market rates used as the 
measure of domestic interest rate, except in the cases of the Philippines (91-day 
Treasury bill rate). Line 11 of the IMF-IFS database (foreign assets of the monetary 
authorities) was used as the measure of foreign exchange reserves.       
 
4.2 Empirical  Testing 
  4.2.1 EMP Index, Unit-Root Test and Ljung-Box Q-statistic Test 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics of the EMP index for the individual 
countries. The following observations can be generated. First, in almost all of the 
countries in East Asia, the EMP index is skewed to the right. Second, the EMP index 
                                                 
9 Similar results were obtained when the nominal exchange rate is used.   14
exhibit excess kurtosis which reflects fat-tailedness.
10 Third, the Jarque-Bera 
statistics are highly significant for all countries which further confirms the non-
normality of the EMP index.
11  This outcome is further substantiated by visual 
evidence in Figure 1 with the histogram of the EMP series for each countries overlaid 
by its corresponding normal probability density functions. In all cases, it is obvious 
that the EMP index depart significantly from the normal distribution mass of 
observations in the tails and the observed regularity of a great number of peak 
observations at the centre of the distribution. 
====================== 
Table 1 and Figure 1 
                                     ====================== 
A preliminary step in proceeding with extreme value analysis is to examine 
the unit-root property of the EMP index. Table 2 presents the combined results from 
the commonly used ADF unit root test as well as from alternative unit root tests the 
DF-GLS and the KPSS tests. In all, the EMP index for all countries are I(0) variables 
at the 1 per cent significance level according to the ADF test. Confirmatory results 
from the DF-GLS test and the KPSS unit-root test show that the EMP index is 
stationary at the 10 percent significance level or even stronger. We also report the 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. With the 
exception for Korea, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for the rest of the countries 
listed in our study (Table 2B).    
 
                                     ===================== 
Tables 2 and 2B 
                                                ===================== 
 
                                                 
10 Excess with respect to the normal distribution which has a kurtosis equal to 3. 
11 Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics further support this result. The results can 
be made available upon request.    15
4.2.2 The Hill and HKKP Estimators 
 In order to capture the tail mass or outliers it is mandatory to estimate the so-
called tail index (γ ), and as earlier mentioned, we use the Hill estimator for this 
purpose.
12 The Hill estimator requires that the EMP series are rank-ordered from 
lowest to highest denoted as (xi), and uses maximum likelihood estimation of the tail 
index (γ ). In accordance with the suggestion of HKPP (2001), to deal with the 
estimation of the tail with a small sample size, we use equation (11) in estimating a 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression for the individual countries, after computing 
the γ (k) for a range of values of k.
13 Consequently, the essence is to identify the right-
tail outliers or ‘extreme value’ observations since the right-tail distribution of any EMP 
index ordered distribution will automatically determine the number and incidence of 
currency pressure episodes that individual countries experienced. Accordingly, 
Diebold, Schuermann, and Stroughair (DSS) (2000) suggested, similarly employed 
by Pozo and Dorantes (2003), recursive residuals were derived from the weighted 
least squares regression to diagnose structural change which will guide us in the 
selection of the optimal k.  
Figure 2 depicts the recursive residuals for the KLR EMP indices across the 
countries in East Asia. The recursive residuals are plotted against the bandwith of 
plus and minus two standard errors, and examination of the recursive residuals in 
relation to the standard errors show an evident instability, generally, starting at the 
right-hand side of the plots. When we consider the empirical distribution of the 
individual ordered EMP indices, the apparent break around the right-hand side of the 
recursive residual plots appropriately correspond to the optimal choice of k,  or 
equivalently, the number of ‘extreme’ or right-tail observations have now been 
identified.                          
                                                 
12 γ  also equals 1/α , where α  refers to the maximum number of existing finite moments.  As is 
customary in the literature, the tail index is either referred to as γ  or α , it is used here 
interchangeably.     
13 The WLS results are not reported here, but they can be made available upon request.     16
================== 
Figure 2 
                                                 ================== 
5. Results  and  Analyses 
 
5.1  EVT and Conventional Approach 
 
Prior to identifying the crisis episodes according to EVT, Table 3 reports the 
crisis incidence for each country over the period 1985 to 2003 using the conventional 
method of selecting an arbitrary threshold of 1.5 - 3 standard deviations for the 
values of the EMP index. The choices of three-month and six-month exclusion 
windows are adopted to calculate the number of crisis episodes, while at the same 
time avoiding counting the same crisis more than once, due to the fact that crisis 
often last for over a month and more crises occur in successive months. The 
incidence rate is a percentage ratio of the number of crises episodes over the total 
number of EMP observations. Clearly, the number and incidence of crises episodes 
are sensitive to the arbitrary choice of the threshold and to the length of the exclusion 
window, i.e., a relatively lower threshold and short exclusion window represent higher 
incidences of crisis episodes, vice-versa.  
================ 
TABLE 3  
================ 
  Tables 4 presents the identification of crises according to EVT, and for 
comparative purposes, we also include the result using the conventional method 
where we include the threshold that has the most number (incidence) of identified 
crisis episodes from table 3 (this is at one and a half standard deviations above the 
mean). The third column of table 4 also reports the optimal k values which were 
derived from the recursive residuals discussed earlier, and the reported values 
clearly show the contrast in the number of extreme right-tail observations, or in the   17





  From Table 4, it is clear that using an alternative approach such as an EVT 
leads to more incidence of crises episodes identified compared to the standard 
approach in the literature. This finding holds across country-specific cases, 
irrespective of the length of the exclusion or crisis window used. In average, the EVT 
results report twice as many crisis incidences as the number captured by the 
conventional method. For Indonesia, arguably one of the most severely effected 
countries by the 1997 financial crisis, the EVT incidence rates of crisis are more than 
three times of the conventional rates. 
More importantly, the overall message derived from the EVT numbers is 
robust and conclusive. Regardless of the exclusion windows (3 months or 6 months) 
for the EVT results the Philippines has the highest incidence rate, followed by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand (Table 4). In contrast, the ordering based 
on the incidence rates for the conventional method is highly sensitive to the size of 
the exclusion windows and the arbitrary choice of the standard deviations for the 
threshold (Tables 3 and 4).  
Once the crisis incidence episodes have been computed, it is now 
conveniently easy to appropriately date the timing of the currency pressure (crises). 
Accordingly, tables 5 and 6 summarised the dates of the attack episodes captured by 
the conventional method and by the EVT, respectively. As expected, the EVT list a 
more comprehensive dating of actual episodes of currency crises for the countries 




5.2  Currency Stability, Political and Economic Events  
  The last, but interesting task, that we have conducted in this study is to try to 
associate the dates listed in Table 6 with economic and political events, local or 
international, that may explain or contribute to the rise in the EMP levels.
14  We break 
the analyses into two periods: the pre-and post-1997 crisis. 
 
  5.2.1   The Pre-1997 Crisis Period 
From tables 6 and 7, it is apparent that about 10 years before the break of the 
1997 financial crises, all five East Asian currencies were attacked a number of times.  
With the exception of Thai baht, the rest of them have in fact been attacked between 
six to eight different periods. In general, these speculative attacks were not 
successful in causing major depreciations of these currencies. But clearly with almost 
one attack per year between 1985-1996, the results indicate that these currencies 
were continuously under high “selling” pressures.   It is also interesting to note that 
these attacks were associated with both political and economic events occurring in 




  There are however interesting differences across countries that are worth 
highlighted here. Speculative attacks on the Indonesian rupiah and the Malaysian 
ringgits during the pre-1997 crisis were largely associated with economic events. 
Under the strong rules of President Soeharto and Prime Minister Mahatir 
                                                 
14 As also indicated by Pozo and Dorantes (2003), the listing of political and economic events 
here is only suggestive of events that may have initiated financial distress. But we have not 
attempted any causation test in any formal way.     19
Mohammad, the political fronts of Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, were 
relatively stable.    
The rapid reforms of the financial sector and the trade sector in Indonesia, 
particularly since mid-to-late 1980s with the opening of the banking sector and the 
capital market have arguably contributed to the rise in speculative attacks on the 
rupiah. With the lack of transparency, due largely to lack of political reforms, the rapid 
opening of the capital account side led to a number of banking failures/scandals in 
early 1990s, with the two major ones occurred in 1990 and 1994. As for Malaysia, the 
‘commodity-price shock’ of the mid-1980s and a number of events related to 
weaknesses in its foreign exchange operations, e.g., the 1994 foreign exchange 
scandal, its short flirtation with capital controls in early 1994 seemed to play 
significant role in triggering currency ‘stress’ in the ringgit in the late 1980s and early 
to mid-1990s.  
  In contrast, Korea and the Philippines appeared to follow similar sequential 
events. In the 1980s, the attacks in their currencies were, in general, largely driven 
by political events. For instance, most of the speculative attacks on the won seem to 
be largely effected by the labour strikes that occurred especially between 1985-1989. 
In the Philippines, the fall of the Marcos regime and the assumption into office of a 
politically-inexperienced leader left the Philippines on very shaky political grounds. 
The presidency of Corazon Aquino, eventually, experienced numerous political coups 
that created weak confidence and uncertainty on the local currency. While in the 90s 
for Korea and the Philippines, the economic shocks contributed more to the rise on 
their respective exchange market pressures.   
In the 1990s, we start to see concerns over economic events in Korea, such 
as the Hanbo scandal in 1991 and the soaring current account deficit in 1996 due to 
the adverse drop in semiconductor prices, as factors that had largely exposed the 
won to more speculative attacks. Late 1980s and early 1990s in the Philippines saw   20
a worsening in both the trade deficit and the energy crisis in the country, which 
triggered higher exchange market pressures on the Philippines peso.  
  Interestingly, the Thailand bath experienced the least number of attacks prior 
to 1997. As in the case of Malaysia, Korea and the Philippines, Thailand had, 
however, also experienced a worsening of its current account deficit in 1995 and 
1996. Concerns over the high consumer spending of luxury imports in Thailand 
heightened uncertainties over the sustainability of the current account deficit and the 
subsequent adverse implication of the deficit on economic growth (Limpaphayom, 
2001).     
  One final note on the pre-1997 crisis period is that major global events such 
as the Gulf War of 1990 and the Mexican crisis of 1995 also created market 
pressures on the East Asian currencies. These external events confirmed the 
increasingly high degree of integration of the East Asian markets with global markets, 
and with it the increasing susceptibility of these economies to adverse developments 
in the international markets.  
  
5.2.2  The 1997 Crisis and The Post-Crisis Period 
  The collapse of the Thai bath on that fateful day of July 2, 1997 and the 
subsequent collapse of the other neighbouring regional currencies had been well 
documented. All currencies observed in this study experienced massive attacks and 
depreciation in mid to late 1997. Several observations are worth highlighting for the 
post-1997 period. 
  First, only the Philippine peso, the Indonesian rupiah, and to a lesser extent, 
the Malaysian ringgit, continued to experience bouts of “mini-crises” until early 2000s. 
Korea and Thailand had successfully contained speculative attacks on their 
currencies by 1998. 
  Second, unlike the pre-crisis experiences, the post-1997 attacks were largely 
driven by political events. The story of the mini-attack on the Malaysian ringgit in   21
early 2001, was largely political which emanated from the aftermath of the 
controversy on the Anwar Ibrahim case. Meanwhile, the story of the attack episodes 
in Indonesia and the Philippines were largely triggered by events, such as the long-
drawn impeachment process against President Estrada and his eventual overthrow 
in 2001, the brief mutiny against President Arroyo in 2003 in the Philippines, and in 
Indonesia, the dismissal of President Habibie and President Wahid in 1999 and 
2001, respectively, worsened an already politically tense situation. Hence, one can 
argue that the difficult struggle of these two countries for political stability has 
contributed significantly to weak market confidences on their currencies during the 
last several years. 
 
6.  Brief Concluding Remarks 
  One key objective of our study is to revisit and re-examine the stability of a 
selected key East Asian currencies prior to the 1997 crisis. Had the currencies been 
stable as frequently documented by early studies? Given the re-occurrences of 
currency crises in different Latin American countries in the last two decades, it is 
undoubtedly important to have a more in-depth understanding of these currencies 
during the post 1997-crisis period. To address these issues, we apply the HKKP-
Extreme Value Theory to a version of the exchange market pressure index employed 
by KLR (1998). 
The adoption of KLR-EMP index is vital here to get a better estimate of 
market pressures on these currencies, as changes in nominal exchange rate alone is 
arguably an inadequate measure. The study has shown that by employing the HKKP-
Extreme Value Theory approach that takes into account the basic statistical 
properties of the KLR-EMP index, we can substantially improve the conventional 
approach in the literature, by capturing more incidences of speculative attacks on the 
five key East Asian currencies during the pre- and post-1997 crisis.    22
Another contribution of the study is with the documentation of the events that 
can be argued to be associated with the speculative attack dates identified in this 
study. Not only that the unfolding economic and political events both in domestic and 
international markets help us enriched our understanding of the similarities and 
diversities of the potential roots of the currency attacks in East Asia, the 
chronological detailing of key economic and political events in this paper are also 
broadly in line with emerging evidence in recent literatures that not only economic 
variables explain the vulnerability of countries to speculative attacks, but also the role 
of politics, especially the role of political uncertainty (Leblang, 2001).      
The findings suggest that despite the reported stable spot nominal exchange 
rates (particularly against the US dollar), the East Asian currencies were under 
frequent attacks since the mid-1980s. Combinations of different events and factors 
such as domestic economic reforms, key global events and a host of political factors 
had arguably been responsible for the high exchange market pressures in the 1980s 
for these currencies. The large number of incidences of high exchange market 
pressures on these currencies pre-1997 crisis clearly challenges the previously 
commonly adopted perception that the 1997 currency crisis in this region was largely 
an unforeseen event. Given a host of mutually-reinforcing factors that validly support 
the susceptibility of these countries to a major currency crises on the eve of July 
1997, such as the gradual build-up of macroeconomic vulnerabilities, e.g., the 
increased size of current account deficits financed by volatile, short-term capital 
flows, and the weak or fragile financial institutions in these countries, these 
“persistent attacks” would eventually be strong enough to bring down the currencies 
in this region as we witnessed in mid-to-late 1997.  
Lastly, we also find that the speculative attacks on the Indonesian rupiah and 
the Philippines peso remain high during the post-1997 financial crisis.  Our findings 
suggest that the root of the problem lies with the high political uncertainties in these 
two economies. Needless to say, without stable and strong governments, these two   23
currencies are at risk of future collapse as we have witnessed with the experiences of 
the Latin American countries during the post two decades.       
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Table 1 
Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis  Jarque-
Bera 
Statistic 
Indonesia  -1.00 9.71 1.17 27.10  5448.91* 
Korea  -1.05 6.22 1.66 18.24  2272.20* 
Malaysia  -0.45 4.61 -0.78  16.91  1837.17* 
Philippines  -0.43 4.58 -0.22  10.35  508.09* 
Thailand  -0.86 4.17 1.30 11.08  675.49* 











































*** 0.039  0.035 
Malaysia  -12.952
*** -12.951
*** -1.537  -2.979





*** 0.250  0.049 
Thailand  -9.649
*** -10.027





* indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10%,            
respectively. 
           
a The ADF/DF-GLS procedure test the null that H0:  yt ~ I(1) against the 
alternative Ha: yt ~ I(0).  
b The KPSS procedure test null that H0:  yt ~ I(0) against the  








Indonesia Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
16.2   53.34*  9.49   9.07   4.13  
 
Notes: the Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 

















3-month 6-month 3-month 6-month 3-month 6-month 3-month 6-month
n window Incidence window Incidence window Incidence window Incidence window Incidence window Incidence window Incidence window Incidence
East Asia
Indonesia 223 5 2.2 4 1.8 4 1.8 3 1.3 2 0.9 1 0.4 2 0.9 1 0.4
K o r e a 2 2 4 62 . 762 . 720 . 920 . 910 . 410 . 410 . 410 . 4
M a l a y s i a 2 2 5 62 . 741 . 841 . 831 . 331 . 320 . 931 . 320 . 9
P h i l i p p i n e s 2 2 5 94 . 083 . 662 . 762 . 741 . 841 . 820 . 920 . 9
T h a i l a n d 2 2 5 62 . 752 . 252 . 241 . 820 . 920 . 910 . 410 . 4
Table 3
Number and Proportion of crisis episodes
Country-Specific Standard Deviation and Mean
 ￿ + 1.5σ  ￿ + 2.0σ ￿ + 2.5σ ￿ + 3.0σ
Optimal No. of Crises Episodes No. of Crises Episodes 3-month  6-month
n k 3-month window Incidence 6-month window Incidence window  Incidence window Incidence
East Asia
Indonesia 223 26 16 7.2 13 5.8 5 2.2 4 1.8
Korea 224 14 12 5.4 11 4.9 6 2.7 6 2.7
Malaysia 225 21 15 6.7 12 5.3 6 2.7 4 1.8
Philippines 225 35 21 9.3 15 6.7 9 4.0 8 3.6
Thailand 225 15 9 4.0 7 3.1 6 2.7 5 2.2
 ￿ + 1.5σ
Country-Specific Standard Deviation and Mean
Conventional Method
Table 4
Number of monthly episodes of crises and incidence of crises using the extreme value theory and conventional methods. 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT)  29
 
 
I ndonesi a Korea M al aysi a Phi l i ppi nes Thai l and
Dec. 1986 M arch 1985 Feb.1985 M arch 1985 Feb.1985
Aug. 1997 Jan. 1986 Apri l  1986 Feb.  1986 Jan. 1995
Jul y 1998 June 1991 M ay, Dec. 1997 M arch 1987 Feb. , Sept . 1997
Feb. 2001 Aug. 1996 Jan., Sept. 1990 June 1998




Cri si s Epi sodes Accordi ng to Conventi onal  Method
Indonesia K orea M alaysia Philippines T hailand
Feb., Sept. 1985 M arch 1985 Feb., Nov. 1985 M arch, Oct. 1985 Feb., Oct. 1985
Nov. 1986 Jan. 1986 Aug. 1986 Sept. 1987 April 1990
June 1987 M arch, Dec. 1987 Feb., Sept. 1988 Oct. 1988 Jan. 1995
July 1988 Feb. 1989 Dec. 1992 July 1989 Feb., Sept. 1997
June 1989 April 1990 Dec. 1994 M arch, Nov. 1990 June 1998
April 1990 June 1991 Sept. 1995 M ay 1992
April 1994 Aug. 1994 April, Nov. 1997 M ay 1993
Sept. 1995 Aug. 1996 June 1998 Feb. 1995
Aug. 1997 M arch, Nov. 1997 M arch 2001 July 1997
April 1998 July 1998
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Table 7 
Crisis Episodes Using Conventional and EVT Methods with  








political events  
Indonesia      
    Feb.,  Sept.  1985  Accelerated slump in 
world oil prices 
      
  Dec. 1986  Nov. 1986  Worsening trade balance 
and increase in external 
debt due to drastic drop 
in world oil prices 
      
    June  1987  Capital flight precipitates 
monetary crisis, and first 
Gebrakan Sumarlin 
results in interbank rates 
of up to 45 per cent; 
foreign investment 
regulations liberalised 
      
    July  1988  Major financial sector 
reforms enacted entry 
provisions liberalised, 
reserve requirements 
reduced, and a 
withholding tax on bank 
deposits imposed 
      
   June  1989  Rumours  that 
government would let the 
rupiah to float; limit set 
on the rupiah’s 
depreciation 
      
    April  1990  A further trade reform 
package; Bank Duta, one 
of the largest private 
banks, announces 
foreign exchange losses 
of $420 million  
      
    April  1994  Another scandal rocks 
the financial system, the 
Bapindo scandal; 
slowdown in the growth 
of non-oil/gas exports; 
eruption of labour unrest 
      
    Sept. 1995  Fallout from the Mexican 
peso crisis 
      
  Aug. 1997  Aug. 1997  Contagion effect from the 
depreciation  of the Thai 
baht hits 
        31
  July  1998  April  1998  Signs new IMF letter of 
intent; President Suharto 
steps down and Vice 
President Habibie takes 
over, amidst violent 
protests; plans to 
implement currency 
board system; IMF 
threatens to cut funding if 
currency board system 
implemented 
      
  Feb. 2001  Feb., Nov. 2001  Dismissal  of 
Abdurrahman Wahid and 
sworning in of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri as 
President; continuing 
political uncertainty and 
serious security concerns
Korea      
  March 1985  March 1985  Exiled  opposition  leader 
Kim Dae Jung returns 
home after a two-year 
exile in the U.S.; 
mounting labour disputes 
and strikes 
      
  Jan. 1986  Jan. 1986  Widespread  student 
protests over Chun Doo 
Hwan’s government; 
reports that overseas 
construction and 
shipbuilding, former top 
industry foreign 
exchange earners are in 
chronic decline 
      
    March,  Dec.  1987  Roh Tae Woo elected 
president amidst 
widespread protests of 
election fraud; 
widespread labour strife 
worsens 
      
    Feb.  1989  Signs of an impending 
economic crisis; 
Continued labour strikes; 
double-digit rise in 
wages; speculation that 
several foreign 
companies including 
foreign banks are 
planning to eliminate or 
drastically cut back their 
operations; Chun Doo 
Hwan, former military 
supporters, and relatives 
accused of a wide range 
of crimes, misrule, and 
corruption     32
      
    April 1990  The won allowed to float 
on a narrow band; the 
Gulf War crisis hits 
      
  June 1991  June 1991  The Hanbo scandal hits; 
further violent student 
riots; growing current 
account deficit  
      
   Aug.  1994  Mounting  opposition 
demands on President 
Kim Young Sam to 
replace his entire cabinet 
or step down himself 
      
  Aug. 1996  Aug. 1996  Soaring  current  account 
deficit due to the so-
called ‘semiconductor 
shock’; mounting foreign 
debt; firing of Deputy 
Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance and 
Economy  
      
 March,  Nov. 
1997 
March, Nov. 1997  Watered-down  labour 
reform bill sparked 
nationwide protests; fall-
out from the devaluation 
of the Thai baht hits 
Malaysia      
  Feb. 1985  Feb., Nov. 1985  Fall  in  most  world 
commodity prices; bank 
runs on one of the 
largest bank, Public 
Bank; collapse of the 
Overseas Trust Bank; 
sacking of the entire top 
management of another 
large bank, Perwira 
Habib 
      
  April 1986  Aug. 1986  Political  uncertainty  with 
the resignation of the 
deputy prime minister 
Datuk Musa Hitam; 
unprecedented fall in the 
prices of nearly all of the 
major export 
commodities continues 
      
   Feb.,  Sept.  1988  Foreign  exchange 
earnings from export 
commodities not being 
remitted back due to 
higher interest rates 
available outside 
Malaysia 
      
   Dec.  1992  Public  announcement  by   33
Prime Minister Mahathir 
that the ringgit is 
undervalued 
      
    Dec.  1994  Central bank governor 
resigns after admission 
that bank Negara had 
racked up foreign 
exchange losses in its 
foreign exchange 
operations over two 
years; tax on capital 
inflows slapped    
      
    Sept.  1995  Vulnerability in its huge 
current account deficit, 
the highest in Asia  
      
  May, Dec. 1997 April, Nov. 1997  Central  bank  restrict 
loans to property and 
stocks to head off a 
crisis; fallout from the 
devaluation of the Thai 
baht 
      
   June  1998  Deputy  Prime  Minister 
and Finance Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim, accused 
of sexual misconduct and 
sacked from government; 
pegs the ringgit at 3.8 to 
a U.S. dollar; 
demonstrations in Kuala 
Lumpur demanding the 
resignation of Prime 
Minister Mahathir 
      
   March  2001  Highest  court  throws  out 
former deputy prime 
minister Anwar Ibrahim’s 
defamation suit against 
Prime Minister Mahathir; 
Finance minister Daim 
Zainuddin resigns, and 
Prime Minister Mahathir, 
in turn, assumes post of 
Finance Minister 
Philippines      
 March  1985, 
Feb. 1986 
March, Oct. 1985  Intensification  of 
disenchantment with 
President Ferdinand 
Marcos and increased 
worries with the 
inevitable transfer of 
power 
      
  March 1987  Sept. 1987  Worries  about  the 
political situation such as 
the first failed coup 
against the Corazon   34
Aquino government and 
increased activity by 
communists insurgents 
      
   Oct.  1988  Continued  political 
weakness; huge debt 
overhang; effect of trade 
liberalisation measures 
      
   July  1989  Another  coup  attempt 
against the Aquino 
administration; energy 
crisis; sharp rise in crude 
oil prices 
      
  Jan, Sept. 1990 March, Nov. 1990  Worsening  trade  deficit; 
huge debt service 
burden; Gulf War crisis  
      
    May  1992  Severe energy crisis; 
large fiscal deficits 
      
   May  1993  Powerful  lobby  of 
exporters, politicians, 
and economists asked 
the Ramos government 
for a sharp depreciation 
of the peso; large capital 
outflows due to 
increased kidnapping of 
ethnic Chinese 
businessmen and the 
government crackdown 
on tax evaders 
      
  March 1995  Feb. 1995  Fallout from the Mexican 
peso crisis hits; 
worsening current 
account deficit 
      
  July 1997  July 1997  Fallout  from  the 
devaluation of the Thai 
baht 
      




      
 Nov.  2000  July  2000  President  Joseph 
Estrada impeached on 
charges of corruption 
      
   April  2001  President  Estrada 
ousted, charged with 
graft and economic 
plunder, arrested and 
jailed 
      
   March  2003  Fighting  escalates  with 
the MILF; mutiny in   35
Manila against the 
Macapagal-Arroyo 
administration 
Thailand      
  Feb. 1985  Feb., Oct. 1985  Failed 15
th coup attempt; 
declining world 
commodity prices; Gen. 
Arthit Kamlang-ek’s 
emotional attack on TV 
against the government; 
collapse of several high-
yielding pyramid fund 
schemes, e.g., Mae 
Chamoy 
      
    April 1990  The Gulf crisis hits 
      
  Jan. 1995  Jan. 1995  Fall out from the Mexican 
peso devaluation; 
ensuing capital flight of 
foreign investors from the 
Bangkok stock exchange 
      
 Feb.,  Sept. 
1997 
Feb., Sept. 1997  Somprasong,  first  Thai 
company to miss 
payments on foreign 
debt; devaluation of the 
Thai baht set off the so-
called East Asian 
financial crisis;  
      
  June 1998  June 1998  Prime  Minister  Chuan 
Leekpai defeats 
parliamentary vote of no 
confidence 
Note: A 6-month exclusion window was used. 
 
Sources:  Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Report published by The Economist 
(various years); Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (various years); Hill, Hal. 2000. The 
Indonesian Economy. Cambridge University Press, U.K; http://www.encyclopedia.com; 
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_risk/couindex.htm; 
http://asiapacific.ca/data/chronology/index.cfm; Asia Yearbook published by the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (various years); http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world.default.stm 
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